This paper will discuss the concepts of neurasthenia
and somatisation and how these and other psychiatric terms have infiltrated
the psychiatric literature on CFS. A selection of publications from
the Australian psychiatric literature will be presented to show these
trends, followed by a brief discussion on cognitive behaviour therapy
and graded exercise therapy. The paper will conclude with the author’s
ideas as to the reasons for psychiatry taking this path and with an
idealistic view of how psychiatry could be involved.
Neurasthenia
The New York neurologist, George Beard, is widely credited with introducing
the term neurasthenia in 1869. However, the psychiatrist Van Deusen
has an equal claim to the authorship of neurasthenia, as he introduced
the term in The American Journal of Insanity in the same year. The
confrontation between neurology and psychiatry at that time continues
to this very day, but at that time it was Beard, the neurologist, who
became most credited with the “discovery” of neurasthenia1,2.
Neurasthenia has been defined as “a disease of the nervous system,
without organic lesion, which may attack any or all parts of the system,
and characterised by enfeeblement of the nervous force, which may have
all degrees of severity, from slight loosening of these forces down
to profound and general prostration”3. Over all, at that time,
it was considered a disease of excessive fatigability, and it was considered
that the fatigability could affect physical and mental function equally.
Even at that time it was noted that there was a significant discrepancy
between physical disability and physical examination, with sufferers
typically looking quite normal. By the turn of the century, neurasthenia
was considered a “fashionable disease”.
It is interesting
to witness the changing ideas over time regarding the aetiology of
neurasthenia. Initially the prevailing neurological paradigm was the “reflex
hypothesis”, in which excessive irritation of the nervous system
was considered to cause exhaustion of peripheral nerves. The next step
was that neurasthenia was considered to have a central origin in which
there was exhaustion of supply of energy in the central nervous system
and this was a consequence of “cortical weakness” or “cortical
irritability”.
This was thought to be caused by
problems with blood supply to the brain, overwork, or from toxic, metabolic
or infective causes.
As time moved on, social theories overtook neurological
ones and it was thought to be a condition of modern civilisation, primarily
from overwork. This also incorporated the changing status of women
at that time and it was thought that the female nervous system, inherently
weaker than the male, may give way as a result of excessive occupational
demands. Due to the failure of the organic paradigm and other social
class issues, such as the illness now being documented also in lower
classes (while it was previously considered a disease of upper classes),
the psychogenic paradigm became the dominant one by the early 1900’s.
Neurasthenia had become a psychological illness with a stigma attached.
By the 1920s the concept of neurasthenia started
to dissolve, as it was replaced by psychiatric diagnoses, such as depression.
This move then towards the psychological had a number of underlying
reasons, including the neuropathological basis of the condition being
discredited, the “rest cure”, which often involved many
months of hibernation in a spa, being seen as either unsuccessful or
efficacious due to psychological reasons, changes in social class distribution
and the emergence of the new profession of psychiatry.
Looking at the concept of modern neurasthenia,
in the United States and United Kingdom formal interest had disappeared
by 1960 and it was dropped from the DSM-III. The term has remained
in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). The diagnosis
is commonly made in some parts of Europe and also made in Asia, being
seen as a physical illness without stigma. In Japan it tends to be
used instead of a psychiatric diagnosis, as Japanese society has a
particular abhorrence of serious mental illness.
It is clear that the historical debates about
organic versus psychogenic paradigms quite clearly parallel the current
debate in the chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) literature. In the last
few years the term neurasthenia has made its way into the CFS literature,
particularly in the psychiatric press4. In such papers, quotes such
as the following have been seen: “Whether or not it is worthwhile
to distinguish between neurasthenia and dysthymic disorders, must depend
on the demonstration that such syndromes have different social covariates
or pursue a different course or have particular responses to treatment.
Until such studies are forthcoming the distinction seems especially
insubstantial”.
The author strongly believes that reviving the
term neurasthenia and using it in the CFS literature is counterproductive,
due to the historical connotations of this term, particularly as it
did finish up as a psychological diagnosis, despite the fact that the
organic versus psychological debate was never really resolved.
Somatisation
An even more concerning trend has been to use the term somatisation
in the CFS literature. Somatisation can be defined as “a process
by which patients experience physical symptoms, most probably the
result of psychological distress, but are attributed by the patient
to a physical cause”. Somatisation is considered the commonest
way for a psychiatric disorder to present and somatoform disorders
are characterised by physical symptoms that resemble medical disease,
but that exhibit no organic pathology or known pathophysiological
mechanism5.
It can be seen that these definitions can easily
be brought into the area of CFS. Firstly, if the doctor’s ideas
about the illness differ from the patient’s, they already fulfill
the first definition of somatisation, because if the patient with CFS
is attributing his or her symptoms to a physical cause and the doctor
is attributing them to a psychological one, the first definition is
fulfilled. Looking at the second definition in which there are physical
symptoms resembling medical disease, but no organic pathology or known
pathophysiological mechanism, CFS can again be readily fitted in to
this definition, as can many other illnesses which still defy our current
level of medical knowledge. The author strongly concludes that somatisation
is a term that must not be used under any circumstances in discussing
CFS.
A SELECTION OF PAPERS
1. CFS and Dieting Disorders:
Diagnosis and Management Problems Griffiths A, Beaumont P,
Moore G, Touyz S. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry;
30:834-838, 1996
This article describes three cases of young people with an obvious
diagnosis of CFS, who the authors “successfully” re-diagnose
with eating disorders. For example—Case 1 Linda is a 13-year-old
girl with glandular fever diagnosed with a positive EBV virus IgM and
typical symptoms of CFS. She is described as having “12-months
of extreme tiredness, exhaustion, myalgia, poor concentration, short-term
memory, intermittent feelings of depression, nausea when eating, loss
of appetite”. “Unsuccessful treatment for chronic fatigue
syndrome” is
described. The authors give a “diagnosis of anorexia nervosa,
but neither she nor her parents would accept it”. They “did
not believe she had anorexia nervosa, preferring to have a physical
disease diagnosis”. The authors state “Denial is a well-known
psychological concomitant of anorexia nervosa and if the patient believes
she may have a disease diagnosis, such as CFS, denial is inadvertently
re-enforced”. They discuss “secondary gains with her CFS” and
conclude by stating “CFS and dieting disorders have several features
in common. They mostly affect young perfectionist females who are high
achievers with vulnerable personalities”. This author expresses
extreme concern about this paper and other papers which re-diagnose
very ill CFS sufferers as suffering with eating disorders.
2. Chronic
fatigue syndrome and Australian psychiatry: lessons from the UK experience Couper J. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry; 34:762-769,
2000
Jeremy Couper is a Melbourne psychiatrist with “an interest” in
CFS. He talks about the UK experience and discusses the fact that membership
of a CFS society correlates with a poorer outcome. He discusses, under
the title of the Australian experience, the first international conference
of CFS in 1998, in which there was “a program which focused almost
exclusively on research into organic aetiologies”. He talks about
a pioneering study of “cognitive-behavioural therapy”,
produced by the Sydney researchers Lloyd, Hickie et al, and goes on
to say “CFS can be seen as a potential Trojan horse for psychiatry,
enabling psychiatry to perform a broader role in medical research and
a more truly integrated role in the health system”. The implications
of psychiatry needing to re-medicalise itself will be discussed later.
3.
Chronic fatigue syndrome in adults Couper J. Australian Doctor, August
2001
The following are some quotations from this paper:
• “Patients are often encouraged to be suspicious of the medical profession’s
attitude to CFS by self help- group literature.”
• “the ideas CFS patients have about the cause of their symptoms can
be seen as the patient’s attempt to understand their illness in terms of
whatever is at the cutting edge of the scientific research of the day.”
• “the more somatic symptoms a patient has, the greater the likelihood
of a psychiatric disorder.”
• “the very distinction between CFS, neurasthenia and depression has
been questioned.”
• “hyperventilation, anxiety and panic
disorder produce feelings of fatigue and increased subjective effort.”
• “somatoform disorders … Whether CFS belongs in this category
largely depends on the doctor’s perspective.”
• “robust research data support the use of antidepressants.”
4.
The School of Psychiatry, University of NSW
Led by Ian Hickie—has published
a lot of contradictory papers in psychiatric literature over the last few years.
In the late 1990’s they talk about the “Immunological bases for
post-infective fatigue states” “role of cytokines” and the
fact that “resolution of fatigue is associated with improvement in cell-mediated
immunity”6, but by 2001 they had published a study which stated that
32% of people diagnosed with CFS had features of a somatoform illness7.
5. Sphere—A
National Depression Project Medical Journal of Australia; 175 Supplement,
2001
This has been a major concern, with the New South Wales researchers being
largely behind the project. Using a 12-item questionnaire that they devised
and called Sphere (Somatic and Psychological Health Report) they found that
49% of patients attending general practitioners have “mental disorders”.
The Sphere has 6 items relating to psychiatric symptoms:
1. Feeling nervous/tense
2. Feeling unhappy/depressed
3. Feeling constantly under strain
4. Everything getting on top of you
5. Losing confidence
6. Being unable to overcome difficulties (Psych-6 items),
and has 6 items
relating to somatic symptoms:
1. Muscle pain after activity
2. Needing to sleep longer
3. Prolonged tiredness after activity
4. Poor sleep
5. Poor concentration
6. Tired muscles after activity (Soma-6 items)
If a person has a score of 2 or more on the Psych-6 and/or 3 or more on the
Soma-6, he or she is defined as having a mental disorder. It is quite clear
to see that a patient with CFS, or glandular fever or a number of other medical
illnesses for that matter, can very easily be defined as being a “mental
case”. This project has large implications for anti-depressant prescribing
in general practice as the project concludes with statements relating to
the under-prescribing of antidepressants for mental disorders.
6. The Second
Draft Guidelines Royal Australasian College of Physicians 2001
The draft guidelines initially published in 1998 have been an attempt to
summarise the current working knowledge on CFS. Unfortunately throughout
this paper the influence of psychiatrists is quite clear.
a) “What other terms are commonly used for CFS”
Neurasthenia is mentioned and “its specific relationship with CFS
and common psychological disorders are not resolved.”
b) Does chronic fatigue overlap with other illnesses?
“Perhaps the most difficult diagnostic uncertainty between CFS and psychological
illness is in relation to somatoform disorders.”
“As the causes of CFS are “unexplained”, there is obvious overlap
between the diagnostic criteria for the somatoform disorders and CFS”.
c) What is known about the pathophysiology of CFS?
There are 5 leading hypotheses mentioned, 2 of which involve psychiatric aetiological
theories.
1. A neuropsychiatric disorder with clinical and neurobiological aspects suggesting
a link to depressive disorder.
2. A psychologically determined response to infection or other stimuli occurring
in “vulnerable” individuals.
Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy and Graded
Exercise Therapy
There have been a number of studies in the medical literature about these
2 “treatments” for
CFS8. A number of papers have discussed the “promising results” seen
with these 2 “treatments”. The author makes the comment that a
number of these studies are methodologically flawed, and it is quite ludicrous
to extrapolate that these 2 therapies can be considered a treatment for CFS.
The author comments that they should be seen as adjuncts only. She has considerable
concern that the number of papers being published about these 2 “treatments” implies
that the underlying aetiology must be psychological.
Psychiatry’s Stance—The
Reasons
The author believes that there are a number of reasons why psychiatry has
tried to “capture” CFS for itself.
1. The name—chronic
fatigue syndrome. Because of its non-specificity
and because it relies on fatigue as the core feature in the title, “poaching” by
any area in medicine is easy. Fatigue is extremely non-specific and
is seen in many conditions in psychiatry, in particular depression,
anxiety and somatisation. Insidiously, in many papers the word “syndrome” has
been dropped and the term chronic fatigue, even more non-specific,
used and sequestered by psychiatry. In the author’s opinion chronic
fatigue syndrome nowhere near adequately describes this illness and
a new name needs to be found, for example, Nightingale’s illness
(after Florence Nightingale who supposedly suffered with CFS). In this
way it clearly places it outside the reach of psychiatry.
2. There is
a strong need for psychiatry to “remedicalise” itself. “Both
scientifically and economically there are questions about the survival
of psychiatry, hence the need to cling to its status as a “medical
science””9. “Born of an alliance between the research
o biological psychiatry and the funding of multi-national drug companies,
pharmacological interventions (the psychopharmacotherapies) are currently
being heavily promoted as primary modalities of treatment”9.
Because psychiatry is a low-status specialty, and because research
funds are given to those who work in the biological field, it is quite
clear that some sections of psychiatry would want to claim fatigue
for psychiatry.
3. Continuing on from the points made in 2., money,
power and politics play a large role. The funding comes to those researchers
working in the biological area. The power comes to those who “discover” new
syndromes or treatments and the behind-thescenes politics in all this
means that those researchers who get the money, who get the publications,
get more money and more power. Economically also, there has been an
erosion financially within psychiatry with changes to certain Medicare
items, making it much more difficult to see people for extensive psychotherapy.
4.
Poorly-designed research abounds in all areas of medicine, but certainly
a number of papers published in the last few years, as described earlier
in this paper, have been poorly designed with results that are consequently
flawed.
5. There has also been a bias in research publishing,
with certain journals only choosing to publish papers on CFS that deal
with psychological issues, for example, cognitive-behaviour therapy.
6.
There is, of course, the problem of coexisting depression, grief and
other psychological complications of chronic illness, which can, for
many people unfamiliar with this condition, over-shadow the biological
component.
7. “Stupid medicine”—this is
the term this author uses to describe medical specialists only seeing
what they are trained to see, for example a psychiatrist only being
able to see depression or a surgeon only seeing something to cut out.
8.
Reading narrowly in one’s own specialty is a real problem, because
the average clinical psychiatrist will only be reading 1 or 2, if that,
journals in his or her own area and is very unlikely to be reading
up-to-date research in other medical journals about CFS, therefore
getting an extremely biased view.
9. Many clinical psychiatrists will
admit to the fact that they have never seen someone with CFS, which
means their experience of the condition, when they do have someone
in their practice with it, is extremely limited. In many cases, they
have, in fact, “seen” CFS in their practice and have mis-diagnosed
it as a psychiatric condition.
Psychiatry and CFS—An
Optimistic View of the Future
Many researchers, clinicians and patients have a clear view that psychiatry
has no place in CFS. This author does not hold that view and believes
that psychiatry and psychiatrists can contribute significantly to research
and to clinical practice. For psychiatry to have a future in CFS, psychiatrists
need to take the time and trouble to educate themselves widely and
not just believe what they are reading in peer-reviewed journals. Psychiatrists
can provide a supportive, educational and validating environment for
patients with CFS as well as advocacy such as at school or in the work
place. A psychiatrist can provide relationship and family support,
help maintain hope and optimism, use adjunct therapy such as relaxation,
meditation and hypnosis, obviously treat co-existing psychiatric illness
and use appropriate psychotherapies, for example grief counselling
and cognitive-behaviour therapy.
In summary, a significant amount of
ill-will towards psychiatry, by those in the CFS area, has been warranted.
The author hopes that, in the future, psychiatrists will take the time
to educate themselves more widely about CFS and is optimistic that
over the next few years, as general medical research moves towards
a unifying aetiological hypothesis and hopefully appropriate treatments,
that the debate about whether CFS is biological or psychological will
fade into oblivion.